

THE EGALITARIANISM OF THE *EUDEMIAN ETHICS*

There are various features of the language and exposition of the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) that allow us to impute what might be called an ‘egalitarian’ outlook to its author. Each of these features, on its own, might be dismissed as of little significance, or as significant yet anomalous; but taken together, they constitute a body of evidence that cannot easily be put aside. The term ‘egalitarianism’ is of course imprecise, yet it serves its function well enough. I shall take it to signify a certain cast of mind which consists of at least the following cluster of dispositions: (i) being unwilling to view society as divided into ranks or classes (e.g. ‘the good’ vs. ‘the bad’; ‘the better sort of people’ vs. ‘the rabble’) or even to use language suggestive of such a division; but rather (ii) having a tendency to see the similarity of everyone with everyone else, by finding some good even among those reputed to be bad, and some bad among those reputed good; furthermore (iii) wishing to identify with the general run of humanity, or at least not being averse to doing so; and (iv) insisting on the fundamental equality and likeness of human beings, so that their inequalities and differences are regarded as secondary.

I believe—though there is no need to argue for it here—that ‘egalitarianism’, even thus roughly defined, marks out something of a *natural kind* of philosophical outlook, which recurs in different cultures and circumstances, though of course in different concrete forms.

I shall present first linguistic, then more broadly textual evidence that *EE* displays this sort of egalitarianism. Of course, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) does not. This is an interesting contrast, and I shall close this paper with a consideration of the various ways in which this difference between the treatises might be explained.

LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE

The language of the *EE* differs from that of *EN* in its use of some terms suggestive of differences in rank among human beings. I shall consider: (I) *μακάριος*, used as roughly equivalent to *εὐδαίμων*; (II) the phrase *οἱ πολλοί*, used either to pick out the vulgar in contrast to some other, select group, or to attribute censurable traits or motives to people in general; and (III) *χαρίεις* (*χαρίεντες*), and *εὐγενής*, *εὐγένεια*, used to refer to a putative better sort of people. For cases (I) and (II), two sorts of evidence are available: first, the mere consideration of differences in frequency; second, the careful comparison of usage in roughly parallel passages in *EE* and *EN*. Although the former sort is perhaps only suggestive, the latter is in aggregate compelling.

Case (I)

μακάριος is nearly absent in *EE*.¹ It occurs only once, at 1215b14. The adverbial form

¹ By *μακάριος* I mean the adjective *μακάριος*, -ία, -ον, in any case, singular or plural, and also substantival forms; and similarly elsewhere in the paper for other adjectives.

(μακαρίως) occurs twice, at 1214a31 and 1215a10.² Since there are only three passages, then, which we need to examine, it will be helpful to present them here:

EE 1.1, 1214a30–2: τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα, τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις.

EE 1.3, 1215a7–12: ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ᾧ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν (εἰ τὸ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν) καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν.

EE 1.4, 1215b6–14: Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν <γὰρ> ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, “οὐθεὶς”, εἶπεν, “ὦν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανείη”. τοῦτον δ’ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ’ ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρώς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς <κατ’> ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

The first passage, which occurs in the very first chapter of *EE*, seems intended simply to set out the equivalence of τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως, and τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. It would be possible to understand the passage as introducing τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως only in order to link it to the other two expressions, so that it could be dispensed with later, in favour of the others. And in fact this is what the second passage, together with the subsequent absence of τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως in the *EE*, would suggest: the author considers the expression invidious, or recognizes that others view it in that way, and so he puts it aside.

The interesting term at 1215a10, ἐπιφθονώτερον, occurs nowhere else in the Aristotelian corpus in the comparative, though one finds the adjective ἐπίφθονος at *Rhet.* 1418b24, where Aristotle recommends that, if a speaker wishes to claim something of himself which is of the sort to incite resentment, then he would be advised to put the claim in the mouth of some respected third party. In Plato, one finds ἐπιφθονώτεραι at *Apol.* 37d2, and ἐπίφθονος at *Lach.* 184c1, *Rep.* 502d7, and *Leg.* 956a1, in each case signifying some action which tends to incite envy among one's fellows.

We shall examine in more detail later the interesting passage about Anaxagoras, which has a strict parallel in X.8 of *EN*. But for the moment it should be noted that it is not implausible to understand μακάριον at 1215b13 as falling within the scope of the thought attributed to Anaxagoras, and thus expressing his mind, rather than that of the author of *EE*. If this is correct, then all three occurrences of μακάριος/μακαρίως in *EE* can be explained away, as not being part of the exposition of the author's doctrine of happiness: 1214a30–2 prepares for dispensing with the term; 1215a7–12 actually dispenses with it; and 1215b6–14 departs from this resolution and uses the term only in attributing an idea to a preceding thinker.

Yet in *EN* the term μακάριος occurs 28 times in the positive, adjectival form; once more as a comparative; twice as a superlative; and once in the adverbial form—for a total of 32 relevant occurrences. (The verb form is also more common, with five occurrences, but this is no part of my argument, for the reasons given above in n. 2.) This in itself is a remarkable difference in frequency, which becomes impossible to

² There is also μακαρίζοντες at 1216a16, but the verb form is fundamentally different, since it is used to signify the attitude or belief that someone is in some way fortunate or well-off. Nor is it the case that μακαρίζειν typically means, precisely, ‘to regard as a μακάριος’. (One might also class, along with μακαρίζειν, formulaic expressions such as μακάριος ὅστις . . . , which are ways of actually expressing the attitude referred to by the verb; yet such do not occur in *EE*.)

ignore when we recall *EE*'s remark at 1215a7–12, which apparently explains the difference. *EN* does not scruple to use *μακάριος* throughout as a synonym for *εὐδαίμων*. It is used in this way in at least 20 passages, across books I, III, VIII, IX, and X: 1098a19; 1100a33; 1100b16, 34; 1101a19, 20; 1113b15, 16; 1169b4, 17, 24; 1170a2, 8, 27, b14; 1176a27; 1177b23; 1178b9, 26; 1179a3. Their interchangeability is illustrated well by the following passages:

EN I.7, 1098a18–20: *μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.*

EN IX.9, 1169b3–5: *Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν κ.τ.λ.*

EN X.8, 1178b8–9: *τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· κ.τ.λ.*

EN X.9, 1179a1–3: *οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· κ.τ.λ.*

Of course, *μακάριος* is not always used in *EN* as a mere synonym for *εὐδαίμων*, since sometimes it clearly connotes, in addition, some extreme degree of happiness or blessedness (cf. 1101a7, 1157b21, 1158a22), which is taken by Aristotle to be characteristic of the divine life of the gods (cf. 1099b18, 1178b26).

In its free use of *μακάριος* as equivalent to *εὐδαίμων*, *EN* resembles both the other relevant work of the Aristotelian corpus, the *Politics*, and the Platonic corpus, whereas *EE* is the odd man out. The *Politics* has seven occurrences of *μακάριος*/*μακαρίως*: 1314b32 (*εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους*); 1323a27 (*bis*), b24 (*εὐδαίμων ... καὶ μακάριος*); 1324a25; 1332a21; and 1338a3. Plato abounds in such passages—there are 32 altogether—and *μακάριος* is used in immediate conjunction with *εὐδαίμων*, and as equivalent to it, in dialogues from all three stages of Plato's philosophical career: *Gorg.* 472d2, 507c4 (*μακάριον τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα*); *Symp.* 193d5 (*μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας*); *Rep.* 344b7 (*εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι*), 354a1; and *Leg.* 660e3, 730c2 (*μακάριος τε καὶ εὐδαίμων*).³ In fact, *μακάριος* in Plato seems to mean no more than *εὐδαίμων*; the *EN* usage, whereby it can signify, in contrast, some extreme or divine sort of happiness, seems not to be evident in Plato. The reason for this is perhaps that, for Plato, *εὐδαιμονία* is *already* something divine: one simply does not find in Plato any distinction marked out between happiness which is *ἀνθρώπινον* and in principle confined to mortal existence, and happiness which transcends corporeal life and is *θεῖον τι*, because it essentially involves life among immortal beings.

So far we have been noting only differences in frequency and usage; but it is also possible to examine passages where *EN* has *μακάριος*, to see whether *EE* has a parallel passage in which only *εὐδαίμων* occurs, or similarly, to look at occurrences of *εὐδαίμων* in *EE*, to see whether there are *EN* parallels which contain *μακάριος*. For presumably parallel passages of the first sort would be instances in which, if the author of *EE* were disposed to use *μακάριος* as equivalent to *εὐδαίμων*, one would expect to find the former as well as the latter; the absence of *μακάριος*, then, given this expectation, would be rather strong evidence that its omission is deliberate. Parallel passages of the second sort would be instances in which, if Aristotle in the *EN* were disposed to observe the same restriction on usage as the author of *EE*, one would

³ I here count the *Gorgias* as a late 'Socratic' dialogue. *μακάριος* is clearly used in the sense of *εὐδαίμων* also at *Lysis* 208a1 and d4, but the latter term does not occur along with it, as in the other passages cited.

expect to find only *εὐδαίμων*; hence, the presence of *μακάριος* would be strong evidence against his adoption of the restriction. Let us say that passages which provide evidence of both types just mentioned are passages that ‘confirm’ the hypothesis of a real difference in usage between *EN* and *EE*.

Of the 32 occurrences of *μακάριος* in *EN*, 22 have no discernible parallel in *EE*, which is a noteworthy fact in its own right; those which have parallels of some sort, and what those parallels are, is indicated in the following list, in which ‘confirming’ passages are underlined:⁴

| <i>EN</i> | <i>EE</i> parallel ⁵ |
|-----------|---------------------------------|
| 1098a19 | <u>1219b5–8</u> |
| 1100a33 | <u>1219b6–8</u> |
| 1152b6–8 | <u>1249a20</u> |
| 1158a22 | <u>1245b11</u> |
| 1169b4 | <u>1244b10</u> |
| 1169b24 | ≈ <u>1244b5–6</u> |
| 1170a8 | <u>1249a20</u> |
| 1170a27 | ≈ <u>1244b27–8</u> |
| 1170b14 | ≈ <u>1245b11</u> |
| 1178b9 | ≈ <u>1217a23–9</u> |

In contrast, nearly all of the dozen or so passages in *EE* which contain *εὐδαίμων* have some rough parallel in *EN* (those instances which overlap with the list above are indicated by an asterisk), and five of these (again underlined) confirm the hypothesis of a real difference:

| <i>EE</i> | <i>EN</i> parallel |
|-----------|---|
| 1214a14 | 1099b9–11 |
| 1215b7 | 1179a12–16 |
| 1216a36 | 1099a7–29 |
| 1217a26 | 1099b32–3 |
| 1219b5–8* | <u>1098a18–20</u> |
| 1244b5 | 1169b7–8 |
| 1244b10 | <u>1169b4–5</u> |
| 124511* | ≈ <u>1158a22–3</u> |
| 1249a20* | ≈ <u>1098b21–5</u> , ≈ <u>1152b6–8</u> , ≈ <u>1177a22–6</u> |

Note that the frequency of confirming *EN* passages in this second group is what one would expect, given the ratio of occurrences of *μακάριος* in proportion to those of *εὐδαίμων* throughout the work: there are 32 occurrences of *μακάριος*, as we have seen, and 36 of *εὐδαίμων*, a ratio of 32:36—that is, the occurrences of *μακάριος* constitute 47% of the total—but in *EN* passages corresponding to those in which *EE*

⁴ That all 15 passages are confirmatory is hardly surprising, since, as we saw, *μακάριος* is nearly absent in *EE*. What is interesting about the list is that it shows how frequently this absence occurs in roughly parallel passages, i.e. those in which one might expect otherwise.

⁵ These parallels differ considerably in closeness to *EN*. It is a puzzling feature of the correspondences of *EE* and *EN* that so often they are quite imperfect: we never see anything that looks like an author simply taking up again the same material he had used elsewhere. I signify those correspondences which are more contestable with the sign for approximate equality, i.e. ‘≈’.

has *εὐδαίμων*, the ratio of occurrences of *μακάριος* to those of *εὐδαίμων* is 5:6—that is, occurrences of *μακάριος* constitute 45% of the total.

It would be tedious to examine all of the passages listed above, so I present only some of the more striking correspondences, which illustrate the difference in usage:

EE, εὐδαίμων ↔ EN, μακάριος

EE, 1217a22–9

[1] ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίονός τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα χεῖρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινῶναι ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θεοῦ τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῆ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν.

EE, 1219b4–8

[2] . . . καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μὴθ' ἡλικίαν πάσαν (διό καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὄλον.)

EE, 1244b10

[3] . . . ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεῖσται φίλου, κ.τ.λ.

EE, 1245b9–11

[4] ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν.

EE, 1249a20–1

[5] διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡδίστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἀξιούσιν.

EN 1178b8–9, 24–8

[1a] τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπελήφμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· . . . σημείον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαυτῆς ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινῶναι θεωρίας.

EN, 1098a18–20

[2a] ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

EN, 1169b4–5

[3a] οὐθὲν γὰρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν.

EN, 1158a22–3

[4a] καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δὲ συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισι, κ.τ.λ.

EN, 1170a6–8

[5a] ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὕσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι.

EN, μακάριος ↔ EE

EN, 1169b4–5

[6] οὐθὲν γὰρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν.

EE, 1244b5–7

[6a] οὕτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὕτε τῶν εὐφραυνόντων οὕτε τοῦ συζῆν κ.τ.λ.

EN, 1170a25–7

[7] εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικέας καὶ μακαρίους) κ.τ.λ.

EE, 1244b26–8

[7a] ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτατον ἐκάστω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὀρεξίς.

Note that in [1] *EE* withholds the term *μακάριος* even for the gods. [2a] shows just how interchangeable *μακάριος* and *εὐδαίμων* are in *EN*; yet, not surprisingly, only the latter is found in the *EE* correlate. [3] and [3a], and [4] and [4a] reveal the interesting tendency of *EE* to use the superlative of *εὐδαίμων* where *EN* has *μακάριος*; perhaps *ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων* in [5] should be interpreted, then, as just a synonym for *ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος*. [6a] is a good example of how *μακάριος* just drops out when it is one of two terms, leaving in this case just *αὐτάρκους*.⁶ Likewise the phrase *καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους* in [7] seems simply to have dropped out, leaving *πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὀρεξις* in [7a] to correspond to *ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ* in [7].

It is a striking fact that, in the so-called ‘common books’ (*EN* V, VI, VII = *EE* IV, V, VI), we find *μακάριος* occurring only once, and then only within the context of an etymological explanation: *καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὀνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν* (1152b6–8). It must be admitted that this provides *some* support for Anthony Kenny’s claim that the common books belong more properly to *EE*.⁷ Yet the support is only slight, for, as is hardly surprising, *EN* tends to deploy *μακάριος* in places where happiness is discussed: in its book I account of the nature of happiness; in the book IX discussion of the relationship between friendship and happiness; and in book X’s return to the topic of contemplation and happiness. But the common books are occupied principally with justice, intellectual virtue, continence; and the term *εὐδαίμων* is itself less frequent in them, occurring only at 1143b19; 1144a5; 1153b14, 17, 20; and 1154a2. Furthermore, 1152b6–8 in part expresses an idea that is echoed in the *EE*, without the use of *μακάριος*—see 1249a20–2—so it might be argued, *contra* Kenny’s thesis, that the idea’s occurrence here, in a different form, is rather consistent with the general pattern of *EN* usage. And in any case it should be said that the explanation of the origin of *μακάριος* which 1152b6–8 provides could hardly account for the word’s inciting envy, which is part of what we should expect an etymology penned for *EE* to accomplish.

Case (II)

οἱ πολλοί hardly occurs in *EE* in a depreciating sense or to draw a contrast with some putatively more select group. This is remarkable, given the usage of *EN*; and, as with *μακάριος*, there are parallel passages which confirm a real difference in usage.

Let us review the usage of *EN*. There *οἱ πολλοί* occurs in various cases some 34 times,⁸ and in three different ways: (i) to draw a contrast with some select class; (ii) to

⁶ I use language such as ‘drops out’ in a phenomenological sense, namely ‘it is as though the word drops out’, not wishing to prejudge questions of temporal priority and authorial dependence; likewise in other discussions below.

⁷ Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford, 1978). Kenny briefly discusses *μακάριος* and *εὐδαίμων* (see chart, bottom of p. 148), but he groups together all ‘cognates’ of each word (e.g. all occurrences of *εὐδαιμονία* get grouped with those of *εὐδαίμων*); hence, he misses the phenomena I consider here. He remarks, concerning his pooled data: ‘by our tests the differences between *AE* [i.e. the common books] and *EE* are insignificant, those between *AE* and *NE* significant’ (p. 149). I have called the difficulties that arise from this way of gathering data ‘the problem of homonymy’. See my review of Kenny’s *Aristotle on the Perfect Life* (Oxford, 1992) in *Ancient Philosophy* 15 (1995), 233–45.

⁸ One cannot have the same confidence in a computer search for this figure, since one wants to capture also cases where the article is separated from the adjective, say, by *γάρ*, and to be sure to exclude instances which are really not germane. This figure was arrived at by pooling the results of two searches: [i] *οἱ πολλοί* (in the various cases); and [ii] *οἱ* (in the various cases) followed

attribute bad motives or traits to the multitude; (iii) in a neutral sense, to signify some tendency or trait shared by all human beings. Instances of type (iii) are relatively few and not of interest to us. They occur at 1150a12, 13; b1, 12; 1151a5—in the midst of the *EN* VII discussion of what sort of response to pleasure or pain counts as softness or endurance. In a remark such as, *ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττάσθαι καὶ ὦν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὦν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττους* (1150a11–13), it seems that *οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ.* does little more than stand proxy for an observation about what happens *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ* among human beings, or about how all human beings, at all times, are strongly disposed to act.

Instances of type (i) are also relatively few, and we may list them for easy comparison later:

EN I.4, 1095a18–20: τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαριέντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

EN I.4, 1095a20–2: περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν.

EN II.4, 1105b9–14: εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσκει γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

EN X.8, 1179a13–17: εἰκοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαιμόνα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θανμάσειεν εἰ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκόασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.

Note that the three groups contrasted with *οἱ πολλοί* are *οἱ χαριέντες*, *οἱ σοφοί*, and a just and temperate man. We shall consider 1179a13–17 more carefully below.

We may suppose that instances of type (ii)—attributions of unsavoury features to ‘the many’—must presume a contrast such as that drawn in the above passages. Type (ii) occurrences are by far the most common in *EN* (there are 24 of them),⁹ and the portrait of ‘the many’ which emerges from them is far from flattering. With regard to pleasures and pains, Aristotle tells us that ‘the many’ identify goodness with pleasure, and badness with pain (1113a33); they find virtue unpleasant, as do children (1099a11, 1179b33); and they live a coarse life of pleasure, not unlike that of a brute animal (1095b16, 19). Their general character is bad (1166b2); in fact, they live irrationally (1168b21). Similarly, the motives they act upon are deplorable: they prefer being loved and receiving favours to loving and giving gifts (1121b15; 1159a12, 14, 17; 1163b26; 1167b27); their life is ruled by a bad sort of self-love which makes them prefer useful goods over noble goods (1168b17, 1169b2), so that they identify friendship with useful relationships (1169b23), and they are quite incapable of seeking honour other than as a token of benefits to come (1159a19). In their outlook, ‘the many’, as we have seen, look only at the surface appearances of things (1179a15); they despise things at random (1124b6). In general, they do not admit of being persuaded

within two lines by *πολλοί* (in the various cases), and not near *οἱ πολλοί* (in the various cases). The first search reveals 33 occurrences, but when these are screened to remove *qualified* uses (e.g. uses of *οἱ πολλοί* with the partitive genitive, as at 1121a30, *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων*), or the obvious statements of *ἔνδοξα* (e.g. 1172a31), which are not relevant, then 28 remain. The second search reveals six more: 1095b18; 1099a11; 1121b14; 1124b5; 1179b10; 1180a4. Thus, the (tentative) total is 34. Note that Kenny’s method of counting frequencies would be much too coarse for our purposes, since we need to avoid entirely the problem of homonymy.

⁹ Besides those listed below, include also: 1105b12, 1124b31, 1125b16.

to act virtuously through argument or through the inherent attraction of nobility, but rather they must be compelled to respond to law by threats of punishment (1179b10, 1180a4). Every careful reader of *EN* has recognized that this attitude of disdain is a constant and pervasive feature of that treatise.

The *Politics* picture of ‘the many’ matches that of *EN*: we are told in that work that ‘the many’ find it pleasant to live a disordered life (1319b32); that they in general live to gratify their appetites (1267b4), seeking dominion over others to procure the goods of fortune for themselves (1324b32, 1333b16). Echoing *EN*,¹⁰ it tells us that οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς (1318b16). We also find in the *Politics*, as in *EN*, the clear distinction between οἱ πολλοί and οἱ χαρίεντες (1266b40–1267a2).

Since there are only four relevant occurrences of οἱ πολλοί in *EE* (six other instances, of type (iii), occur at 1222a17, 41; 1228b34, 37 (*bis*); and 1238a27), we shall list them:

EE I.3, 1214b34–1215a2: . . . ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν <ἐπισκεπτέον>· εἰκὴ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ <ταύτης>· ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν ταύτης γε περὶ <ἐπισκεπτέον> μόνας· κ.τ.λ.

EE III.5, 1232b14–16: οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι· κ.τ.λ.

EE VII.10, 1243a35–b2: οἱ δ’ ἄρχονται μὲν ὥς οἱ ἡθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι’ ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ’ ἄντικρυς ἢ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν, διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίῳ φιλίαν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII.3 = EE VII.15, 1249a10–13: ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ καλὰ ἐστὶ· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κἀκεῖνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, τῷ δ’ ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθὰ· κ.τ.λ.

The sheer difference in frequency of the expression can be vividly illustrated in the following way. If we exclude the common books, *EN* has 39,525 words and *EE* 26,330.¹¹ The ratio of *EE/EN* material, then, is almost exactly 2:3; and, if the *EE* usage of οἱ πολλοί matched that of *EN* we should expect to find some 23 occurrences of the expression, instead of 9, and some 16 attributions of bad characteristics to ‘the many’, instead of the mere doubtful 4 we do find.

When we look carefully at the four seeming occurrences of type (ii), we see that it is not evident that these have functions like those in *EN*. The first passage, 1214b34–1215a2, is quite corrupt. Indeed, the trustworthy text ends with τῶν πολλῶν; hence it is unclear whether this expression should in fact be understood in an unqualified sense, so that it means ‘the multitude’. For instance, if 1216a23, ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγούρας, had been corrupted after οἱ πολλοί, then we would have misunderstood that expression, had we then taken it as unqualified. Thus it is not clear that the present text, as reconstructed, does not similarly mislead; and indeed *EE*’s exposition of its doctrine of happiness, which does *not* appeal only to the opinions of ‘the wise’ (see the section below on happiness), gives us reason to think that the conjecture of Walzer and Dodds (in angled brackets) is not in fact correct.¹² But if so, then the significance of the entire passage remains problematic, and little if any weight can be placed on it.

¹⁰ Cf. 1121b14, 1159a12, 14, 17; 1163b26, and 1167b27.

¹¹ I derive these figures from Kenny, *Aristotelian Ethics*, pp. 92–6.

¹² Their conjecture was apparently arrived at by analogy with *EN*, but the soundness of that analogy is precisely what is in question here.

The second passage, 1232b14–16, is the statement of an *aporia*, so the claim that a great-spirited man is ‘disdainful of the multitude’ cannot be straightforwardly ascribed to the author of *EE*. In fact, *EE* hardly resolves the *aporia* in any clear way—it only states, somewhat obliquely, that one would need to draw a distinction between the opinions of those who are *ἄξιοι λόγου* and *οἱ τύχοντες* (1232b18–19), and it does not say precisely how this should be done. But more importantly, that the *aporia* arises at all in *EE* illustrates how different its outlook is from that of *EN*, where it is simply taken for granted that a *μεγαλόψυχος* cares little for the opinions of ‘the many’. It is as though the reader needs to be reminded of this class, ‘the many’, or its existence needs to be constructed in some way, to resolve the *aporia*.

The remaining two remarks are certainly far more restrained than what we find in *EN*. It is not even clear that the first passage actually attributes anything bad to ‘the many’. That necessity in various ways takes priority over nobility is a common Aristotelian theme: city-states form first for the sake of mere living, though they may continue for the sake of living well (*EN* VIII.9, 1160a9–12, *Pol.* 1278b23ff.); the pursuit of theoretical researches for their own sake, in the development of civilizations, had to follow upon people being greedy from the demands of necessity (*Met.* I.2, 982b11–28); a king can only seek noble goods through his office if he himself has a self-sufficiency and detachment from need (*EN* VIII.10, 1160b3–7); friendship seems to presuppose some self-sufficiency in material goods (*EN* IX.10, 1170b23–9); the primary sort of happiness, contemplative activity, can be engaged in only to the extent that a person is liberated from the demands of the human condition, rooted in necessity, which require, rather, the moral virtues (X.8, 1178b33–1179a5). Thus, *ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλὸν, διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν* may simply be a frank recognition of the human state, not a censure.

This is a suggestion which gains in plausibility when we put 1243a35–b2 up against its *EN* parallel, 1162b33–1163a1: *οὐκ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετῆσθαι*. The *EN* passage suggests duplicity, whether consciously intended or not: people put on a show of forming friendships based on virtue, because they in some deep sense recognize that his sort of bond is better, or want to be seen as recognizing that it is better; but they never really want this with seriousness, or completely, and their characters cannot in any case sustain their intention. We find a similar thought, and a stronger suggestion of duplicity, at *Rhet.* 1399a30–1: *... οὐ ταῦτ᾽ ἀφανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανερῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερώς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, κ.τ.λ.* But *EE* seems to attribute not duplicity, but rather a conditional or constrained pursuit of nobility: people really do pursue nobility, when they have superfluous goods; yet when such goods fail, as they typically do (either because most people are not long prosperous, or they have too weak a grasp on the virtues of liberality and temperance, so that they eventually deplete whatever funds might be available for free gifts), they are bound to seek a *quid pro quo*. That we do not find *EN*’s reproach in *EE* suggests that perhaps we should not expect to find a reproach at all.

At worst, the fault attributed to ‘the many’ by *EE* at 1243a35–b2 is a kind of lack of integrity between the pursuit of nobility and those ordinary activities of common life which are constrained by necessity. ‘The many’ have not, perhaps, acquired the virtues by which they can convert their non-leisurely activities into expressions of and means to acquiring nobility—which is indeed the distinctive trait of the *καλοκάγαθός* (cf.

1248b37–1249a17). Yet, if this is the point of the passage, then it is attributing the same shortcoming as does the second passage, 1249a10–13—and both passages would be presenting a very different diagnosis of the defects of the ordinary man than do the dozens of passages about ‘the many’ in *EN* and *Politics*.

The difference of frequency of οἱ πολλοί between *EE* and *EN*, and the very clear difference in *what* is attributed to ‘the many’, are unusual and remarkable. Yet, as in the case of μακάριος and εὐδαίμων, the suspicion that this evidence marks a real difference in usage needs to be confirmed, by passages in which we do not find *EE* using οἱ πολλοί, though we should expect it to do so, if the habits of usage of the author of *EE* were the same as those of Aristotle in *EN*. In some cases, one finds that *EN* has *dicta* regarding οἱ πολλοί which *EE* simply omits; in others, *EE* manages to express an idea similar to *EN*, but without using that expression.

For instance, both ethics contain a discussion of ‘wish’, βούλησις, and both draw a distinction between the natural and the apparent object of wish (*EN* III.4, *EE* II.10). But, whereas *EN* makes its claim in terms of ‘the many’, and speaks of their being deceived, the corresponding *EE* claim is unrestricted and without suggestions of censure:

EN 1113a31–4

... καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ὥτως ὁ
σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθές ἐν
ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ
μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς
δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰσὶ
γίνεσθαι· κ.τ.λ.

EE 1227a28–9, 39–b1

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει
μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ, παρὰ φύσιν
δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ... οὕτω γὰρ
ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ
μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἥδιον
ἄμεινον.

Again, *EE* IX.8 develops an elaborate contrast between two sorts of self-love: a good sort, which consists in caring for the mind and the goods of the mind, which a virtuous person has; and a bad sort, which consists in pursuing the ‘fought over’ goods (περιμάχητα) of the body, and which is said to be characteristic of ‘the many’. The *EE* discussion of self-love in VII.6 lacks this contrast (in fact, it more closely resembles *EN* IX.4 than IX.8); it talks merely about the *absence* of self-love, and this only as it occurs in a *bad person*, not ‘the many’:

EN 1168b17–21, 1169b1–2

τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται,
καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς
ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά
ἐστίν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα
πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς
ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι
καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς·
τοιούτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί·
... οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι
δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ’ οἱ
πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

EE 1240b14–17, 19–21

ἢ δ’ εἰς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς
καὶ ὁ κατ’ ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὁ
γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλοί,
καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ
ἐμπληκτος ... ὅτι γὰρ πῃ ὁμοῖος
καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός,
ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ
ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ’
ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν.

If it is objected that the above comparison is not to the point, because there is no strict *EE* parallel for *EN* IX.8, and *EE* VII.6 corresponds solely to *EN* IX.4, then we can turn to the latter, and there find depreciating remarks about ‘the many’ which *EE* lacks, e.g. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὐσι φαύλοις (1166b2–3). Yet surely that *EE* lacks anything like this lengthy *EN* passage attributing bad self-love to the multitude is in itself some evidence of egalitarianism.

Yet another instance is the contrast between *EN* IX.9 and *EE* VII.12, which both discuss the *aporia* about whether a happy person, who has all good things, will need friends. *EN* traces the *aporia* to the tendency of ‘the many’ to confuse useful friends with friends *simpliciter*, so that they cannot see how friends would still be necessary, if one is self-sufficient, which happiness implies, and there is no longer any need to procure useful goods: οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἶονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι (1169b23–4). *EE* lacks this line of thought; it says, rather, that the *aporia* arises from a confusion between human and divine nature: whereas god’s self-sufficiency is isolable and monadic, a human being’s must be relational, αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ’ ἑτερον, ἐκείνῳ [sc. τῷ θεῷ] δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν (1245b18–19). Of course, *EE* does not attribute this confusion specifically to ‘the many’.

Another telling comparison is in how the two treatises make use of Anaxagoras’ dictum about the appearance of a happy man, two passages we have seen already:

EE X.8, 1179a13–17

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν
τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
θαυμάσειεν εἰ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς
πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς
ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον.
συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἔοικασιν αἱ
τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.

EE I.4, 1215b6–14

Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν <γὰρ> ὁ
Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ
εὐδαιμονέστατος, “οὐθεὶς”, εἶπεν,
“ὧν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος ἂν
τίς σοι φανείη”. τοῦτον δ’
ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος,
ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον
ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα
καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης
τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας,
αὐτὸς δ’ ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα
ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ
δίκαιον ἢ τινος θεωρίας
κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὥς
<κατ’> ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον
εἶναι.

Whereas *EN* takes the misunderstanding about happiness, which Anaxagoras anticipates and corrects, to be a flaw in ‘the many’, which can be attributed to their superficiality, *EE* refers Anaxagoras’ saying, rather, to an unidentified ‘you’, with whom the reader can more readily identify, and who is not contrasted with any other group (‘the wise’) not prone to this sort of misunderstanding.

Finally, two other correspondences, which illustrate well the difference in usage and outlook, are: (i) *EN* 1121b15–16, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί, which is embedded in the discussion of liberality in IX.1, to which *EE* III.4 corresponds fairly closely, though *EE* lacks this *dictum* about ‘the many’; and (ii) *EE* IX.7, which discusses the *aporia* about why benefactors love their beneficiaries more than the reverse, to which *EE* VII.8 is a strict parallel; but *EE* lacks any remark corresponding to the *EN* observation at 1167b27 that ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.

As with μακάριος, in their usage of οἱ πολλοί, *EN* and *Politics* are close to Plato, and *EE* is the odd man out. Plato, of course, frequently refers to ‘the many’ as being prone to follow appearances, to seek the satisfaction of their desires by pleasures and the acquisition of things, and who thereby become susceptible to the deceits of would-be tyrants (see, e.g. *Rep.* 431c10, 586b5, 591d8, 602b3; *Gorg.* 459e5, 483b6, 488d5, 491d10).

Case (III)

Words with the root *χαριε-* occur 19 times in the Aristotelian corpus. The substantival participial forms, *χαρίεις*, *χαρίεντες*, occur 13 times, 8 of which are in *EN*—1095a18, b22; 1127b31; 1128a31, b1; 1162b10 (cp. 1102a22, 1128a15)¹³—where these words typically denote an upper-class, or a better sort of person. There are four similar occurrences in the *Politics*: 1267a1, 40; 1297b9; 1320b7. As we have seen, in both works *οἱ χαρίεντες* are directly contrasted with *οἱ πολλοί*. Yet *χαρίεις*, *χαρίεντες* are completely absent in *EE*. Hence, we may assert that *EE* declines to draw the distinction, between ‘the many’ and the better sort, from both sides.

χαρίεις, *χαρίεντες* are, of course, quite common in Plato, even though, in the Platonic corpus, they typically mean simply ‘gracious’ and lack the suggestion of a difference in class, or of a moral hierarchy, as in the Aristotelian corpus.

There is a similar, though less pronounced, difference in the usage of *εὐγενής* and *εὐγένεια*. These words are common in the *Politics*, with its various discussions of the source of authority in the state. The doctrine there is that there is indeed a natural nobility, analogous to natural slavery, which nature intends to pass down from parents to offspring, but does not always succeed in doing (cf. 1255a27–40); and that good birth is a good incommensurable with others, and a reasonable basis for claiming authority, though with not as strong a claim as virtue (cf. 1282b32–9, 1283a2–b19), presumably because it is only something like the raw material of virtue. The five occurrences of the word in *EN* are consistent with this doctrine, although *EN* is more concerned with how good birth, as a good of fortune, enters into happiness (cf. 1099b3, 1124a21). The most interesting occurrence is 1179b8, where Aristotle asserts that there is a kind of good birth which enables someone to be stimulated to virtue simply through moral exhortation, unlike ‘the many’:

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν θέογονιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμησάμεν τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἥθος τ’ εὐγενές καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ’ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· κ.τ.λ. (1179b4–13).

Aristotle goes on to explain that what makes ‘the many’ intractable to argument and a sense of shame is that they live by their emotions and have had no experience of the ‘true pleasure’ which comes from nobility. Thus, *EN*’s use of *εὐγενής* and *εὐγένεια* is of a piece with its tendency to draw apparently class-based distinctions in the moral quality of people.

But this usage, too, is absent in *EE*, where we find only two rather insignificant occurrences of the words: (i) 1233a30 closes a discussion of *μεγαλοψυχία* by noting that small-spiritedness could take the form of someone’s being *εὐγενής* but thinking that holding office would be some great thing; and (ii) 1249a10 is a perfunctory mention of *εὐγένεια* as something that befits a *καλοκάγαθος*. In the former, being *εὐγενής* seems to be contrasted with being a *μέτοικος*, and thus it apparently means no more than ‘being a citizen’. In the latter, good birth simply finds a place on a standard list of external goods (there called *φύσει ἀγαθά*): *πλοῦτος εὐγένεια δύναμις*.

Finally, it should be noted that, in the case of *εὐγενής/εὐγένεια* as well, the usage of

¹³ Cf. also 1127b23, which uses *χαριέστεροι*.

EN and *Politics* is close to that of the Platonic corpus, and *EE* is in comparison anomalous.

BROADER TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

The linguistic evidence presented above is clear and hard evidence of some sort of distinction between *EE* and *EN*, but that the distinction is the expression of a difference in philosophical outlook, arising from *EE*'s 'egalitarianism', needs further support. This is to be found, I believe, through a patient comparison of the discussions in *EN* and *EE* of those topics where the hypothetical difference in outlook would be most apparent, namely in their discussions of (I) friendship; (II) the virtue of great-spiritedness; and (III) the conditions and extent of happiness. (The topic of justice, which involves equality, would be equally important, yet it is treated of in the first of the 'common books').

(I) Friendship

Egalitarianism is evident in *EE*'s concern to show that the phenomena of friendship are widespread, and that there is a basis for friendship even among people who are not good; and also in its according greater priority to friendship based on equality, especially civic friendship (πολιτικὴ φιλία).

EN, in developing its account of the three forms of friendship, uses the language derived from the logical works, of a distinction between a predication of a term which is καθ' αὐτό as opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Only in friendship based on likeness of virtue do the friends love each other καθ' αὐτούς (1156b2, 8–11); in the two other forms, the love and the friendship are κατὰ συμβεβηκός (1156a16, b11). The distinction is admittedly a difficult one, as applied here, but in any case it would be natural for someone familiar with Aristotle's logical doctrines to wonder, in light of its application, whether there was not an equivocation in referring to all three forms by the same term. Aristotle in fact acknowledges the force of this worry, and he tells us that this use of the term is a concession to popular speech: ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρησίμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις . . . καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὥσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, κ.τ.λ. (1157a25–30). But the character of the *EE* discussion is remarkably different. It makes use of 'focal analysis' (πρὸς ἓν), which is, of course, intended as a device for unifying, into a coherent subject matter, various subjects which might be thought to be disparate. It reminds us repeatedly that to withhold the term from any of the three forms would be a logical impropriety and do violence to the phenomena (1236b21–6, 1236a15–32). Moreover, the language it uses to distinguish friendship based on virtue is that of ordinal ranking—it is πρώτη φιλία, the others are δεύτεραι—which does not impugn the standing of the latter as friendships. Thus, the tendency of *EE* is to broaden the proper application of the term φιλία, that of *EN* is to restrict it.

This difference in 'logical' outlook has an analogue in the attitudes of the two treatises towards friendships among bad people. *EN* raises early on the *aporia* of πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι (VIII.1, 1155b11–12), and its answer is that δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῶν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς. κ.τ.λ. (VIII.4, 1157a16–19)—and that is the end of its interest in friendships among bad people. But

EE attempts to describe at some length the friendship for pleasure (seemingly richer than the friendship for pleasure adumbrated in *EN*), and a friendship based on likeness (which has no parallel in *EN*), in which bad people can participate (VII.2, 1238a35–b14). In this passage, the author of *EE* thrice affirms his confidence in the universal extension of friendship, because of the universal presence of some good in all human beings—which is presumably his motive for the discussion:

EE 1238a35–8: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ἢ φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾧδικοὶ ἄμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλωδὸς ὁ δ' ᾧδικὸς ἐστίν, καὶ ἢ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· κ.τ.λ.

EE 1238b10–14: εἷη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ἢ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ἢ ἐνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἐνιοὶ ὀμιλητικοὶ εἶεν ἂν καὶ σπουδαῖω. ἢ ἢ προσαρμόττουσιν ἑκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γὰρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

But nothing at all like this is found in *EN*.

As a small but perhaps related point, it should be noted that when they discuss the difficulty of forming a friendship based on virtue, both *EN* and *EE*, in very similar passages, discuss the time and experience required (*EN* 1156b24–32; *EE* 1237b7–1238a10); but *EN* has the additional remark, without correlate in *EE*, that σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι (1156b24–6). Of course, *EE* holds, as does *EN*, that the commonest sort of friendship is that based on utility (1236a33); but *EE*'s apparent reluctance to stress the restricted scope of friendship for virtue, is consistent with the hypothesis of egalitarianism. In fact, *EE* nowhere even mentions the ἐνδοξον to which *EN* alludes.

The second 'egalitarian' difference in *EE* doctrine on friendship is its view that members of an unequal friendship, although they share a *φιλία*, are none the less not *φίλοι*:

EE VII.4, 1239a3–6: αἱ μὲν γὰρ [sc. τῶν φιλιῶν] κατὰ τὸ ἕσον αἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν εἰσίν. φίλῃαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φίλει δὲ γε καὶ φιλεῖται.

EE VII.4, 1239a19–21: φανερόν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι.

EE VII.5, 1240a4–7: πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· κ.τ.λ.

The second and third passages above seem to refer back to the distinction drawn in the first, so by its repetition we can conclude that the author of *EE* takes it to be important; yet nothing comparable is found in *EN*, where we are given no reason to think that unequal friends are not friends. On the contrary, the discussion in *EN* VIII.7, about how friendship must cease if the inequality between friends becomes too great, seems in fact to assume that the partners' being *φίλοι* and their being bound by a *φιλία* are interdependent.¹⁴ When the interval becomes too great, then οὐ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν (1158b34–5) which implies that they were so, even as the inequality was growing. And such is the implication also of 1159a35–b2, which states basic *EN* doctrine of how friends remain friends, even given inequality: . . . ἐν οἷς τοῦτο [sc. τὸ

¹⁴ Note that, whereas the passage talks about whether the friends remain *φίλοι*, it is prefaced by general remarks contrasting, as regards equality, τὸ δίκαιον and *φιλία*, not οἱ δίκαιοι and *φίλοι*. (That the latter sort of language would be natural enough, if indeed Aristotle wished to restrict his thesis only to *φίλοι*, and not *φιλία* and *φίλοι* interchangeably, is clear from 1155a26–8.)

φιλεῖν] γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἄν.

This basic difference in doctrine seems to be the source of a different account of civic friendship (ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία) in the two treatises. Both treatises adopt the simple taxonomy of constitutions which appears also in *Politics* III: kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy (which *EE*, along with some parts of the *Politics*, prefers to refer to as simply πολιτεία), and their corresponding corruptions. But *EE* applies to this scheme the distinction between equality κατ' ἀριθμόν and κατ' ἀναλογίαν, and it says that ἡ <πολιτικὴ> κοινωνία is an instance of the former, whereas ἀριστοκρατικὴ κοινωνία and βασιλικὴ κοινωνία are instances of the latter (1241b32–40). This would seem to make civic friendship equivalent to the sort of relationship that citizens have only in a πολιτεία. The reason for this is presumably to be found in *EE*'s remark that μόνη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλαίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (1242a9–11). Thus, the reasoning of *EE* is apparently that, in civic friendship, citizens need to regard one another as φίλοι (presumably because only so will they have the right motives for acting lawfully, and, especially, be able to act with ἐπιείκεια, cf. *EN* V.10 = *EE* IV.10, esp. 1138a1–2); but this cannot be the case if the relationship were unequal and based on a proportionate equality; so it can be found only in republican government, and also in its corruption, so that we can properly speak of a πολιτικὴ κοινωνία only in these two forms.

This doctrine is, of course, foreign to *EN*, which, in contrast, favours kingship over timocracy, and apparently argues for a supreme degree of civic friendship in kingship among the correct forms of government, and the lowest degree in timocracy. *EN* can take an opposite position, since it conceives of civic friendship as based upon the juridical relationship that citizens have to one another, through the constitution of their πόλις; the better sort of constitution, Aristotle argues, has the most justice and therefore the most friendship (cf. VIII.10–11, *passim*). But *EE* seems to regard civic friendship as a direct relationship among individuals, which is mediated by economic ties (cf. 1242a6–15).

Finally, further evidence of the egalitarianism of the *EE* doctrine of friendship, in contrast with *EN*, can be found through an examination of the closely parallel passages, *EE* VII.4, 1239a21–b2 and *EN* VIII.8, 1159a12–b1:

***EE* VII.4, 1239a21–35**

[1] δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι
μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ'
ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα.
ἄμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε
φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή.

[2] διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἐνίοις
ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου·

[3] ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ
ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ.

[4] μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι·
τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ.

***EE* VIII.8, 1159a12–28**

[1a] οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ
φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν·

[2a] διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί·

[3a] ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ
κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος
καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι·

[4a] τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι
δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὐ δὲ οἱ
πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.

[5] φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῆς ὁ φιλητικὸς. ἔστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη <φιλεῖν> ἐνεργεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὐ.

[6] ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημείον δέ· κ.τ.λ.

[5a] οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' εὐόκασιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἶονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἂν τοῦ δέωνται· ὥς δὴ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)· οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιώσει τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν·

[6a] διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημείον δ' κ.τ.λ.

These passages resemble each other to such an extent that it would be difficult to maintain that there was no dependence of one upon the other; hence, we should presume that the differences in expression and doctrine are intended and actual. Notice first the systematic difference in language: corresponding to *EN*'s three uses of οἱ πολλοί, *EE* gives us, instead, οἱ ἄνθρωποι, παρ' ἐνίοις, and οἱ φιλότιμοι.

Moreover, the tendency of *EE* is to present a softer, more qualified claim than *EN*. οἱ ἄνθρωποι in [1] serves not to restrict the opening thesis to any specific class; and then [2]–[5] serve to limit the thesis to people who are connaturally disposed to seek admiration and attention. Since we are not told the relative sizes of the two types of temperament described, we have no idea of how widespread, according to *EE*, the preference for unequal friendship is: οἱ φιλότιμοι could be small in number. We might also think that their disposition is in some sense not up to them, since they are so by nature. In contrast, *EN* leads us to believe that the flaw it describes is widespread, and that it is rooted in some sort of misappreciation of the choiceworthiness of useful as opposed to noble goods.

This flaw, according to *EN*, is actually a compound one, since 'the many' not only prefer loving to being loved, but also fail to appreciate being loved for what it is, and interpret it only as a sign of future benefits. In contrast, *EE* certainly refers to οἱ φιλότιμοι as though they appreciate being loved for its own sake. Yet in another passage, it brings a charge like that which *EN* brings against 'the many', but now against people in authority, remarking that ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως (1216a23–7). This is in striking contrast to *EN*'s characterization of the 'political life' pursued by οἱ χαριέντες καὶ πρακτικοί as one devoted to virtue and honour (I.5, 1095b22–31).

Note, furthermore, that whereas *EE*'s remark about the preference for a flatterer 'among some people' (παρ' ἐνίοις) seems to be a claim merely about habits of personal association, *EN*'s observation that 'the many' (or even 'the multitude') are fond of flatterers carries with it an unmistakable political suggestion, and the passage should probably be understood as hinting at a reason for the success of demagogues, namely

the tendency of 'the many' to prefer relationships in which they are superior leads, perversely and ironically, to their becoming the inferiors of tyrants. But *EE* has personalized *EN*'s remark, so that it no longer contains political implications.

(II) Magnanimity

On the hypothesis of egalitarianism, we should expect that *EE* would treat of the virtue of *μεγαλοψυχία* in such a way as to broaden its scope of application and diminish its relationship to differences of class or birth. We might also expect that *EE* would be concerned to argue that the virtue is not something that should be *ἐπιφθονον*. In fact, these expectations are confirmed by a careful comparison of the *EE* and *EN* accounts. I shall state simply the principal points:

(a) *EE gives the virtue less importance.* In its enumeration of the moral virtues in II.7, and in the exposition which follows, *EN* places the two virtues that have to do with greatness—*μεγαλοπρέπεια*, *μεγαλοψυχία*—in front, immediately after the important virtues of courage, temperance, and liberality. However, *EE* places *μεγαλοπρέπεια* and *μεγαλοψυχία* at the bottom of its list at 1220b38–1221a12 (except for *φρόνησις*) and one chapter from the end of its exposition of the moral virtues (III.5–6). Furthermore, the *EN* discussion of the *μεγαλόψυχος* begins by taking for granted the existence of such persons: they simply need to be defined and distinguished from those having the two contrary vices—*ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἔστι πρῶτον λάβωμεν· διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν* (1123a34–6). But *EE*, while also asserting that the trait of character needs to be discerned by its expression in people who have the trait, speaks as though the very existence of such people might not be noticed or admitted: *περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδόμενων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <α> κατὰ τὴν γειννίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτο συμβέβηκεν* (1232a19–23).¹⁵

(b) *EE broadens the scope of application of the virtue.* At the beginning of its account, *EN* stresses that greatness is essential to the virtue, *ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ* (1123b6–8). *EE* holds to this doctrine in letter only, not in spirit. First of all, *EE* observes that every virtue makes a person great in some respect, so much so that it becomes a problem whether there is a single virtue of *μεγαλοψυχία* having to do with greatness (1232b23–7). Secondly, after saying that a man who correctly expects moderate honours is *οὔτε πάνπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος, περὶ οὐδὲν ἔτ' ὧν μέγεθος* (1233a17–18), *EE* insists that he is, nevertheless, essentially and in the most important sense the same as a great-spirited man, *ὥς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει* καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (1233a23–3). In fact, he *would* become a great-spirited man, if only given the opportunity, *καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος* (1233a24). This is to suggest that it is only in view of external contingencies that we would deny the term of him. Thus, the upshot of the *EE* discussion is that an ordinary person can, with justification, say there is no virtue the *μεγαλόψυχος* has which is not available also to him.

(c) *EE apparently detaches μεγαλοψυχία from considerations of class and birth.* The evidence here is slight but perhaps significant. *EN* at least discusses the relationship

¹⁵ *EE* reads as though it is defending a received doctrine, but in a context in which that doctrine appears doubtful or controversial.

between *μεγαλοψυχία* and good birth, and its view is roughly that, although birth, wealth, and power do not justify expectations of honour, nevertheless, a *μεγαλόψυχος* acts in the way that people who have such things act, though the *μεγαλόψυχος* does so justifiably (1124b4–6). *EN* also seems to concede that good birth can enhance a person's *μεγαλοψυχία*. (Cf. 1124a21–b6.) But *EE* lacks any consideration of these topics. Similarly, *EE* lacks any analogue to *EN*'s extended character portrait of a *μεγαλόψυχος* (1124b7–1125a16), which surely describes mannerisms restricted to persons of a certain class and breeding, and not merely how someone acts *ὡς ὁ λόγος κελεύει* with regard to honours.

(d) *EE* is concerned to show that *μεγαλοψυχία* provides no cause for resentment or envy. *EN* frankly acknowledges that *μεγαλόψυχοι* seem to be *ὑπερόπται* (1124a20, a word not found in *EE*), and this is explained, not as something analogous to what one finds in the other virtues, but rather as an attitude towards external goods distinctive of a *μεγαλόψυχος*. But *EN* then seems even to dwell upon and magnify the attitude of contempt which a *μεγαλόψυχος* displays: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ* (b5–6); and *παρρησιαστής γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι* (b29). We are also told that he will not simply ignore, but rather despise, honours from ordinary people for small-minded reasons: *τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος* (1232a38–9, e.g. courage requires a disdain of fearful things); and, furthermore, the putative disdain of a *μεγαλόψυχος* involves his being able to distinguish great from insignificant things, and to prefer the former—but, again, all virtues involve this (1232b19–26).

(III) Happiness

EE's egalitarianism is exhibited in its account of the accessibility of happiness to an ordinary person.

(a) *The EE view is that the right sorts of beliefs about happiness are available to everyone.* This is manifested in its gentle critique of errors about happiness, in I.5, 1215b15–1216a10. Such errors, it says, concern matters that are difficult for *anyone* to decide, precisely because they are so familiar. And when it discusses them dialectically, *EE* consistently appeals, not to the authority of the wise, but to how anyone would choose, who was correctly set the question: *εἴ τις αἵρεσιν ἐδίδου* (1215b21); *ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν* (b23–4); *οὐ μᾶλλον ἔνεκ' ἂν τις τούτων ἐλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν* (b29–30); *οὐδ' ἂν εἰς προτιμῆσειε τὸ ζῆν* (b34). There is no precise analogue in *EN* of this discussion, which is noteworthy; yet, note that the opening of *EN* I.4, which perhaps comes closest, shows no sympathy whatsoever for people who hold confused views about the nature of happiness; and the remarks of *EN* I.4–5 suggest that the sorts of considerations *EE* brings to bear will simply have no weight with someone who was not educated into the ways of virtue.

(b) *EE does not stress the importance of good upbringing, as does EN.* The *EN* view, famously, is that a person's character will be formed, for good or for ill, by the time he is in a position to study ethics; so it cannot be the aim of ethics to provoke conversion, or to sway, towards a life of virtue, someone who was previously undecided. Ethics consists, rather, of finding reasons for living the life of virtue, in which one is already engaged, more reliably and with greater stability. These views are set forth in the well-known methodological passages in I.4–5. Now *EE* has no analogue for these passages, and its author in fact seems to reject their views; for one finds in *EE* simply the claim that the aim of ethics is virtuous action and not merely correct definition

(1216b3–25), but this is argued for in such a way that it no more rules out learning virtue late in life than learning *any* skill then. Furthermore, *EE* seems to affirm the potential for any human being to come to accept the truth about happiness and virtue, and thus come to act correctly, by beginning with the element of truth within anyone's grasp: *κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογούντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, κ.τ.λ.* (1216b28–31). There is no similar presupposition of the possibility of moral conversion in *EN*.

(c) *EE* detaches happiness from political authority. *EE*'s development of a definition of happiness does not presuppose the structure of the πόλις, as does that of *EN*, which approaches happiness by identifying it with a highest practical good, which is in turn conceived of as that which is aimed at by the highest τέχνη in a hierarchy of τέχναι. This highest τέχνη it calls ἡ πολιτική—so at the very start of *EN*, the question of the pursuit of happiness, and that of the correct use of political authority are intertwined, so much so that the *EN* can be read simultaneously as both a guide to private behaviour and a handbook for legislators intent on framing sound laws. But *EE* seems to arrive at the conception of a highest good through psychological rather than structural considerations (1214b6–14). To separate the ethical from the political in this way is egalitarian, simply because the possibility of political rule is not as widely distributed as the possibility of leading a coherent life. One might also cite, in this regard, *EE*'s unusual recommendation of friendship at 1235a2–4: *καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτῃται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.*

EXPLANATION

There seem to be five possible explanations for the difference between *EN* and *EE*, which I have called *EE*'s 'egalitarianism':

1. The difference is simply that between two performances expressive of the same outlook: *EE* and *EN* are two tokens of the same type of ethical theory.
2. *EE* and *EN* were written for different purposes or audiences, but they express the same viewpoint.
3. *EE* and *EN* represent the same, Aristotelian ethical theory and outlook, refracted through the views of one or more note-takers or editors.
4. The difference between *EE* and *EN* actually reflects a change in outlook by Aristotle during his philosophical career.
5. *EE* and *EN* are in fact by different authors.

A basic presumption against (1) is Spengel's old argument against the authenticity of *EE*,¹⁶ which certainly has strength against the restricted hypothesis of (1): philosophers typically do not write two treatises covering exactly the same ground, for the same purposes and audience. In any case, the differences between *EE* and *EN* seem greater than could be explained on the hypothesis of a mere repetition of performance. Moreover, since *EE*, *EN* and *Politics* themselves seem to consist of smaller treatises composed separately, if the observed difference between *EE* and *EN*

¹⁶ L. Spengel, 'Über die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen Ethischen Schriften' in *Abhandlungen der Philosophisch-Philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, (Munich, III.i, 1841; III.iii, 1843).

could be explained in the manner of (1), then presumably one would find similar differences within each of the treatises; yet we saw each is remarkably consistent in its usage of *μακάριος*, etc.

Hypothesis (2) is essentially D. J. Allan's.¹⁷ The hypothesis cannot be entirely excluded, yet it seems to me less satisfactory in explaining a fundamental difference in ethical outlook of the sort documented here, than in accounting for a mere difference in methodology, which is Allan's concern. Allan compares the difference between *EN* and *EE*, as regards method, with that between Descartes's *Meditations* and *Principles of Philosophy*, published only three years apart (in 1641 and 1644);¹⁸ but a difference in method, so conceived, is simply a difference in the manner of exposition of the same doctrine. Yet, we could hardly explain, in a similar way, the difference I have referred to as *EE*'s comparative 'egalitarianism', without implicitly accusing Aristotle of insincerity or lack of integrity; for at least one treatise would have to be a misrepresentation, or at least a masking, of the author's actual view—occasioned, presumably, by a desire to please or persuade a particular audience.

Against (3), the difference of 'egalitarianism' is not one that can be easily explained as a difference in note-taking or editing: deprecating remarks about 'the many', for example, are simply absent throughout *EE*, not altered or corrected; again, such things as the *order* of exposition of the virtues cannot be attributed to the filtering work of a note-taker. Furthermore, one finds no discrepancies in tone or viewpoint in *EE* that would indicate such 'correction'. Moreover, if *in general* the differences between *EE* and *EN* cannot be explained in this way, then *EE*'s 'egalitarianism' should not. (However, when we turn to a work that is plausibly the construction of a note-taker or editor, the *Magna Moralia*, we find that it is a patchwork of 'egalitarian' and 'non-egalitarian' characteristics, as one might expect, e.g. *μακάριος* and *χαρίεις* are absent, as in *EE*, but *οἱ πολλοί* is sometimes used in the *EN* sense.)

With regard to (4), that a writer on ethical and political matters, living in fourth-century B.C. Athens, might change from aristocratic to democratic sentiments, or vice versa, would be implausible, given the turbulent political background of the conquests of Philip and Alexander, and the reactions of the contending parties in Athens—the effect of which was to polarize and harden Athenians in their political views. Furthermore, there is no evidence, in Aristotle's corpus or in the biographical tradition, that he did change; rather, as A.-H. Chroust has observed, Aristotle's various departures from and returns to Athens are consistent with, and perhaps best explained by, the hypothesis that he retained throughout his life a sympathy for the Macedonian court, and that he was openly lacking in sympathy with Athenian democracy.¹⁹

Hypothesis (5) is I think the most plausible explanation of *EE*'s egalitarianism, on psychological, philosophical, and historical grounds. It is not an objection that *EE* would then so closely resemble *EN*, while altering in a radical way and in a certain respect its fundamental outlook, since such has been the nature of school works and commentaries throughout the history of philosophy.²⁰ I can only mention here other

¹⁷ See D. J. Allan, 'Quasi-mathematical method in the *Eudemian Ethics*', in S. Mansion (ed.), *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode* (Louvain, 1961), pp. 303–18. 'The method which an author adopts in an inquiry', Allan writes, 'is largely determined by his conception of its purpose, and we may begin by asking whether our two versions set before themselves the same general aim' (p. 304).

¹⁸ See Allan, *ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁹ See A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle* (University of Notre Dame, 1973), vol. I.

²⁰ Max Scheler correctly notes in his *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden,

confirmatory evidence of (5): there are signs that *EE*, in various places, attempts to resolve difficulties in *EN*, or clarify or improve doctrines of *EN*, and its clumsiness in doing so makes it implausible to attribute these to the author of *EN*;²¹ again, *EE* seems at times even to misunderstand doctrines stated in *EN*, which could hardly be attributed to the author of *EN*;²² at one point *EE* seems to quote *EN*, in such a way as to suggest the criticism of a distinct author;²³ and the fact that *EE* uses what appear to be paraphrases of clever and compact formulas in *EN* suggests that it is by a different hand.²⁴ One might also add to these the various arguments that *EE* is later than *EN*,²⁵ since it is plausible to argue that, if *EE* is later, and yet it is an inferior piece of philosophy, then it is not authentic.²⁶

What I have called *EE*'s 'egalitarianism' itself accords better with a late date for *EE*, since it seems in some ways to be a kind of anticipation of fundamental characteristics of Hellenistic philosophy—its universalizing tendencies, for instance, resemble, or at

CT, 1973) that, 'Whereas the tendency in modern times has been to take up ideas which have been unconsciously acquired and thought a thousand times, and put them forward as new and original, the older (medieval) habit was to extract ideas which actually were new and original from such authors as were invested with special authority' (p. 254). But this habit is peripatetic as well as medieval.

²¹ I take the following to be among passages of this sort:

(1) *EE* 1234a21–3, which seems intended to answer the question posed at *EN* 1128a25–7;

(2) *EE* 1228b17–38, which apparently attempts to clarify the seeming contradiction in the *EN* account of courage, in that *EN* in III.6–7 holds that a courageous person does and does not fear the objects of fear in the face of which he stands firm;

(3) *EE* 1229a30–b13, which seems to give an explanation of why courage must be defined with respect to death (whereas *EN* had only stated that this was so);

(4) the *aporia* about the character of the great-spirited man at *EE* 1232b14ff., which seems to make explicit a difficulty latent in the *EN* text;

(5) *EE* 1234a24–34 (cf. also 1233b16–18), which seems to try to resolve the problem in *EN* that some *πάθη* are also listed as virtues and vices (e.g. *φιλία*, *φθόνος*), by developing the category in which *EN* had placed *αἰδώς* (said to be a *πάθος* by *EN*), so that is now includes a variety of praiseworthy and blameworthy *μεσότητες*, which, however, are without *προαίρεσις*, and so are neither virtues nor vices, properly speaking.

²² Its use of *πρὸς ἑν* analysis for the three forms of friendship seems to be an instance of this, since that analysis, it seems, cannot be made to work, as A. Price and others have urged. See Anthony Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 134ff.

²³ Although *EE* and *EN* have many passages that are roughly parallel, I know of no instance in which they coincide almost word-for-word, except *EE* 1249b5–6, *τοῦτο δ' ἀληθές μὲν, οὐ σαφές δέ, and EN* 1138b25–6, *ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές*. It seems to me that the best explanation for this single coincidence of language is that the author of *EE*, familiar with *EN*, is quoting *EN*, precisely at the point where the former provides its resolution for what *EE* has quite explicitly identified as the problem of the *ὄρος* for virtuous action—this in order to remind the reader that the problem, although raised, was never solved in *EN*.

²⁴ A clear example of this is *EN*'s definition of a great-spirited man, *ὁ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξίωv ἄξιος ὢν* (1123b2, 8, 15–16), and *EE*'s corresponding *ὢν ἀξίος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων* (1233a2–3, cf. 1232b31–2). The hypothesis that Aristotle hit upon the compact formula in *EN*, only after having worked with the clumsy version of *EE*, seems to me far less plausible than that a later writer approved of the definition, but either did not wish, or was unable (because of changes in the language) to use it verbatim. Similarly, the *EN* formula is easily remembered (and perhaps designed for this purpose), so it is difficult to believe that Aristotle on a later occasion would not have it available to him, or that a student taking notes on his lectures would not transcribe it exactly.

²⁵ See Kenny, *Aristotelian Ethics*, pp. 215–39.

²⁶ Most scholars, I believe, accept this inference, yet they draw from it the conclusion (which is the *sententia communis*) that *EE* is earlier—this even though Jaeger's arguments have been discredited, so that we really ought to consider that the debate has essentially returned to the terms originally defined by Spengel.

least are compatible with, Hellenistic cosmopolitanism; and its turn away from the public realm to the private, where our actions are more ‘up to us’, seems of a piece with the subjective turn of the Hellenistic period.²⁷ Yet this subject, and other historical considerations—such as the relationship between *EE*’s egalitarianism and democratic movements (in Athens, or even in Rhodes), or whether *EE*’s change in language reflects a broader change in the acceptance of some fundamental ethical terms—need to be investigated elsewhere.²⁸

*Department of Philosophy,
Clark University, Worcester, MA*

M. PAKALUK
mpakaluk@clarku.edu

²⁷ Another such anticipation, though not evidently related to its egalitarianism, is *EE*’s prominent doctrine of *τὸ κοινὸν* in VIII.1.

²⁸ Research for this paper was supported in part by a grant from the Higgins School of the Humanities at Clark University. I am grateful for comments from Lindsay Judson, David Konstan, Andrea Nightingale, Anthony Price, Jeffrey Wills, and Charles Young.